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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is derived from Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2.
V
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Does a person have a constitutional right to act in reliance on the plain
language of an ordinance without fear that such conduct may be found to be
negligent based upon a subsequent court ruling invalidating the ordinance?

2.

Did the majority's opinion affirming the ruling of the Trial Court deny Tyler
Hansen due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States and by Article I Section 7 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah, as defined in Bouie v City of Columbus,
387 U.S. 347(1964)?

3.

Did the Court of Appeals err in deciding that Salt Lake City Ordinance
12.80.070(1) was invalid, being in conflict with state statutes?

4.

Did the Court of Appeals err, by invalidating an ordinance without joining
the City, contrary to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11?

5.

Is Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070 a reasonable and valid exercise of the
power, granted to cities by Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-17(l)(h), to
regulate the operation of bicycles within the City?
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6.

Did Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070 allow Petitioner, Tyler Hansen, to
ride his bicycle eastbound in the north bicycle lane on 200 South at 500 East
on February 17,2000?

7.

Can a person be found negligent solely for riding a bicycle in a designated
bicycle lane on the left-hand side of a roadway, where a duly enacted city
ordinance allows such conduct?

8.

Can a person be found to be negligent for acting in conformance with an
existing city ordinance which is later be determined to be invalid?

9.

Did the Trial Court err in holding that the jury could be instructed that riding
a bicycle in the left-hand bicycle lane was not justified by the Salt Lake City
Ordinance?

10.

Should the Trial Court have granted Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment?

The above issues are questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. Orton v
Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998).
These issues were preserved for appeal in the arguments presented to the Trial
Court at oral argument on the various motions for Partial Summary Judgment. They were
argued on June 5, 2002 and discussed in the various memoranda submitted to the Trial
Court in support of the motions for Partial Summary Judgment. See Transcript of June 5,
2002 hearing on motions for summary judgment (hereinafter "Transcript" or "Tr");
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Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated September 26,
2001 (hereinafter "Memorandum"); Response to Cross Motion of Defendant, the Nature
Conservancy, for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Renewed
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated April 5, 2002 (hereinafter "Response");
Reply to Response of Defendant, the Nature Conservancy, to Plaintiffs Renewed Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment dated April 22, 2002 (hereinafter "Reply").

YI
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES and REGULATIONS
The following Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules and
Regulations have bearing on the issues raised in this appeal.
1.

Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1

2.

Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 7

3.

Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-17

4.

Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87

5.

Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87.5

6.

Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-5

7.

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-33-11

8.

Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070
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VII
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Plaintiffs/Petitioners, Tyler Hansen and The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah,
brought this action for negligence. The case involves a collision between a bicycle driven
by Tyler Hansen and a motor vehicle driven by Amanda Eyre which occurred in a bicycle
lane located at 500 East and 200 South in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Petitioners claimed, inter alia, that Tyler Hansen (hereinafter "Hansen") was
lawfully riding his bicycle eastbound in the north bicycle lane on 200 South in Salt Lake
City, Utah on February 17, 2000; that as Hansen approached the 500 East intersection on a
green light, Amanda S. Eyre (hereinafter "Eyre") was stopped facing south on a red light;
that Eyre commenced a right turn on a red light, turning westward through a designated
bicycle lane onto 200 South and struck Hansen with the front of her car; and that at the
time of the collision, Hansen was riding eastbound in the bicycle lane as allowed by Salt
Lake City Ordinance 12.70.080(1)(I).
At the time of the collision, both Hansen and Eyre were acting in the course of their
employment. Eyre's employer, the Nature Conservancy Group (hereinafter "Nature") was
named as a defendant on a theory of respondent superior. Hansen was covered by Workers
Compensation insurance at the time of the accident. The Workers Compensation Fund of
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Utah (hereinafter w4the Fund") paid substantial benefits to Hansen for injuries received in
the collision. The Fund was named as a Plaintiff based on its statutory subrogation rights.
The Respondents claimed Hansen was negligent because he was riding in a bicycle
lane on the left hand side of 200 South at the time of the collision. Discussions between
counsel revealed an intent by Respondents to claim that under state law, and
notwithstanding the provisions of the city ordinance, a bicycle rider was absolutely
required to operate his bicycle only on the right-hand side of a roadway. Thus,
Respondents claimed, Hanson's conduct, being in violation of state law, was negligent.
Respondents claimed Hansen had no right to act as allowed by Ordinance 12.80.070
because it conflicted with state law.
Therefore, Petitioners asked the Trial Court to rule that pursuant to Salt Lake City
Ordinance 12.80.070(1), Hansen did have a legal right, on February 17, 2000, to travel
eastbound in the north bicycle lane on 200 South as he approached 500 East. Respondents
countered with their own Summary Judgment Motion arguing that state law required
Hansen to operate his bicycle only on the right side of the roadway and that City
Ordinance 12.80.070 conflicted with state law and was, therefore, invalid. See R. 109-126
On June 5, 2002, the matter was argued to the Trial Court, Judge Bruce Lubeck
presiding. Petitioners claimed the city ordinance was valid on the date of the accident and
by its plain language allowed Hansen to ride in the left-hand lane. They also argued that
even if the Court held the ordinance invalid, it could only invalidate it prospectively. See
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Memorandum, supra: Response, supra; Reply, supra: Transcnpt ('Tr.") at 5-7. Hansen
argued that the plain language of the ordinance allowed him to ride in the left-hand bicycle
lane and therefore his riding in the left-hand bicycle lane was not negligent. Tr. 5-7. On
June 5, 2002, the trial court denied both Motions for Summary Judgment and said:
The Court finds that State law was and is (and probably always
has been) clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction of motor
vehicle traffic.

An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with
such state law . . . Thus, an ordinance that allows such bicycle
traffic . . . may or may not be within the police powers of the
city. The Court is not ruling on that aspect as it is without
sufficient facts.

The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that
Plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor state law in
traveling in the direction he was against traffic (emphasis
added). R. 164.

Petitioners timely filed a petition for permission to appeal the Court's June 5, 2002
Order pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Petitioners asked the
Supreme Court to review the denial of their Summary Judgment Motion and to rule that the
Salt Lake City Ordinance was valid on the date of the accident and that Hansen had a right
to act in conformance with the plain language of the Ordinance. Petitioners felt that
judicial economy would best be served if the Trial Court's inconsistent rulings were
corrected prior to trial and the issue of Hansen's right to ride his bicycle in reliance on the
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plain language of the Ordinance determined so that correct jury instructions on the issue of
negligence could be given at trial. Respondents did not appeal the Trial Court's denial of
their Summary Judgment Motion.
On August 23, 2002, the Supreme Court granted permission to appeal and then
assigned the case to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
On July 25, 2003, in a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
Trial Court. Moreover, they held that the Salt Lake City Ordinance was in fact invalid.
On August 7, 2003, petitioners filed a petition for rehearing with the Court of
Appeals. They pointed out that the Court had decided only one issue, to wit, that there was
a conflict between state law and the city ordinance. Petitioners asked the Court to
reconsider its opinion because it did not determine whether or not its ruling would be
applied retroactively. Hansen claimed retroactive application of the ruling to his conduct on
February 17, 2000 would deny to him due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by Article I Section 7 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
On August 19, 2003, the Petition for Rehearing was denied.
Petitioners filed a timely petition with this Court for a Writ of Certiorari. The
Petition was granted on December 2, 2003.
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B.

Statement of Facts

On February 17, 2000, Hansen was riding his bicycle eastbound in a designated
bicycle lane on the north side of 200 South approaching 500 East in Salt Lake City. As
Hansen approached 500 East, the traffic signal for eastbound traffic was green.
Eyre was southbound on 500 East and stopped for a red light at 200 South. With the
light red for southbound traffic, she commenced a right turn onto 200 South. As she
rounded the corner and began crossing a designated bicycle lane, she struck Hansen who
was riding in the designated bicycle lane at the time of the collision.
At the time of the collision, Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) specifically
allowed bicycle riders to ride on the left-hand side of a roadway within a designated bicycle
lane.
VIII
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I
A PERSON HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO RELY UPON THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE OF AN EXISTING CITY ORDINANCE.
Both the Constitution of the United States and the Utah State Constitution guarantee
a person due process of law. United States Constitution Amendment XIV, Section 1; Utah
State Constitution Article I, Section 7.
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Due process protections ensure fair warning of conduct which is proscribed by law.
See State v. Blowers, 1X1 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986); Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador
County, 87 Ca. Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617,626 (1970); People v. Frazer, 88 Cal. Rptr.2d 312,
982 P.2d 180 (1999); People v. Escobar, 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100, 1107 (1992).
Due process is intended to prevent the inherent unfairness which would result from altering
the legal consequences of events or acts after the fact. See People v. Frazer, 88 Cal.
Rptr.2d 312, 982 P.2d 180 (1999); State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788, 795
(1981); People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326 (Colo. 1993). A person is entitled, under theories
of due process, to act in reliance on the plain language of existing laws without fear that
such conduct may later be made punishable by a court which subsequently determines that
there is a conflict between state and local law. See, e.g. Bouie v City of Columbus, 387
U.S.347 (1964); State v. Byers, supra; Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, supra.
Due process of law allows a person to rely on the plain language of an existing city
ordinance in determining what actions may be taken without fear of legal consequences.
To hold otherwise clearly violates recognized constitutional principles of due process. Id.
Point II
CONDUCT WHICH COMPLIES WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF AN EXISTING
ORDINANCE IS NOT NEGLIGENT.
To be found negligent, a person must have a legal duty to act in a defined manner,
breach that duty, and thereby cause injury to another.
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In the present case, Respondents claim Hansen had a legal duty to ride his bicycle
only on the right-hand side of the roadway. Respondents claim that Hansen breached this
duty by riding in the left-hand bicycle lane and that such breach was a contributing cause of
the collision between Hansen and Eyre. Respondents seek to use Model Utah Jury
Instruction ("MUJI") 3.11 in conjunction with state statutes which generally require a
vehicle to be driven on the right side of a roadway to argue that Hansen was negligent in
riding in the left-hand bicycle lane. To support this claim, Respondents asked the Trial
Court to rule, as a matter of law, that Hanson had no legal right to ride in the left-hand
bicycle lane.
Petitioners claim that the plain language of Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070
allows a bicycle rider to use the left-hand bicycle lane, and, therefore, such conduct cannot
of itself constitute negligence. Petitioners responded to Respondents' arguments by stating
that even if the Trial Court should strike down the city ordinance, Hansen's conduct on the
date of the collision would not be unlawful or negligent because he had acted pursuant to
an extant city ordinance that allowed him to travel in the left-hand bicycle lane. Tr. 6.
Respondents' attempts, throughout these proceedings, to have the court declare the
city ordinance invalid ignore the issue of Hansen's right to rely on existing law. Due
process considerations forbid use of a post-collision ruling on the validity of the city
ordinance as a basis for determining whether or not Hansen's conduct on February 17, 2000
was negligent. See Point 1, supra.
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This issue is crucial to Petitioners in this case, because in Utah, a person is prima
facie negligent if he or she acts in violation of a law such as Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87.
E.g. Jorgensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80 (Utah 1987); Hall v. Warren, 692 P.2d 737 (Utah
1984). Model Utah Jury Instructions CMUJI") 1f 3.11.
Utah law allows a jury to find a person negligent for violating a law intended to
promote safety. E.g. Gaw v State ex rel. Dep V of Transportation, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah App.
1990); Hall v Warren, supra. However, where a city ordinance by its plain language allows
certain conduct, due process considerations preclude a finding that such conduct is
negligent based upon a later finding by a court that there is a conflict between the city
ordinance and a state law. Bouie v City of Columbus, 387 U.S.347 (1964); State v. Byers,
supra; Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, supra. People v. Frazer, supra; People
v. Escobar, 3 Cal 4th 740, 837 P.2d 1100 (1992).
Point HI
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 41-6-17n¥h) ALLOWS LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO
REGULATE THE OPERATION OF BICYCLES WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTION.
SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 12.80.070(1) IS A REASONABLE AND VALID
EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO REGULATE BICYCLES.
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-17(l)(h) grants to cities the power and authority
to adopt ordinances to regulate the operation of bicycles within city limits. This power is
subject only to the reasonable exercise of the police power.

11

Pursuant to this grant of authority, Salt Lake City adopted Ordinances which
regulated the operation of bicycles. It required, inter alia, that on streets with designated
bicycle lanes, the operator of a bicycle must ride within the bicycle lane [Section
12.80.070(H)], but the rider has the option to ride in a bicycle lane on either side of the
street [Section 12.80.070(1)].
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-87 requires bicycle riders traveling at less than
the normal speed of traffic to travel on the right side of the roadway, subject to certain
exceptions set forth in said section. Section 41-6-87(3) provides such an exception for
travel within a bicycle lane or path. A reasonable exercise of the police power would allow
the city to create and regulate the use of designated bicycle lanes on either side of the
roadway within city limits.
Respondents argued that the right-hand travel requirement of Section 41-6-87 was
absolute; that there are no exceptions to the requirement; and that therefore the City's
Ordinance was invalid. Respondents ignore the exceptions to this rule created by
subsection 3 of the Statute.
The Trial Court ruled that Respondents had failed to meet their burden of showing
the City Ordinance exceeded the power to adopt bicycle ordinances granted by Section 416-17(1). For that reason, the trial court declined to invalidate Ordinance 12.80.070. R. 164.
Because the defense offered no evidence upon which the Trial Court or Court of
Appeals could rely to invalidate the Salt Lake City Bicycle Ordinance, the Ordinance is
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presumptively valid. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). Therefore, Hansen
was acting lawfully when he rode his bicycle eastbound on the north side of 200 South at
the time of the collision with the Eyre vehicle and the Trial Court should have granted
Summary Judgment to Petitioners on that issue.
Point IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION FOR HANSEN RIDING HIS BICYCLE EASTBOUND IN THE
NORTH BICYCLE LANE ON 200 SOUTH.
In its June 5, 2002 Order, R. 162, the Trial Court refused to invalidate Salt Lake City
Ordinance 12.80.070, yet it ruled that the jury must be instructed that Hansen had no legal
justification for riding in the left-hand bicycle lane at the time of the collision with the Eyre
vehicle. Such a ruling is logically inconsistent and in error.
When read together, the State Statute (41-6-87) and City Ordinance (12.80.070) do
not create a conflict. Section 41-6-87 is a general statute providing that in defined
circumstances, bicycle riders are to ride, with certain defined exceptions, on the right-hand
side of the road.1 The City Ordinance is specific as to where bicycles are to be ridden when
there are designated bicycle lanes on a city street. There is no irreconcilable conflict with

'One of the exceptions designated is when traveling in a designated bicycle path
(lane). See Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87(3). A designated bicycle lane which is
adjacent to the traveled portion of a city street would clearly be within the exception set
forth in Section 41-6-87(3)
13

the State Statute that also requires that bicycles be operated in designated bicycle lanes.
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87(3). Because the City Ordinance allowed for use of the
left-hand bicycle lane on the date of the accident, Hansen was justified to act in accordance
with the plain language of the Ordinance. To rule otherwise denies him due process of law.
The Court has a duty to construe an ordinance so as to give it full force and effect.
Jerz v Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991). The Court also construes acts to be in
harmony so as to avoid conflicts. Id; Murray City v Hall, supra.
Because courts have a duty to construe each enactment so as to give it full force and
effect, wherever possible, they should construe acts to be in harmony and to avoid conflicts.
This is especially so in this case, because the duty set forth in U.C.A. Section 41-6-87 is not
absolute, being subject to certain exceptions. The legislature itself has provided exceptions
to the general duty to ride on the right-hand side of the roadway. One of these is travel in a
designated bicycle lane. This Court should harmonize the two acts to give effect to each.
The Ordinance allowing travel in a left-hand bicycle lane is a valid exercise of the City's
police power and Hansen was, as a matter of law, justified in riding in conformity
therewith.
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Point V
THE VALIDITY OF SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 12.80,070(0 WAS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DECISION.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-33-11 states:
... In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal
... ordinance ... such municipality ... shall be made a party ...
The Respondents in this case did not notify Salt Lake City Corporation of their claim that
Ordinance 12.80.070(1) was invalid. Salt Lake City was not made a party to the underlying
action in the Trial Court.
The lower court specifically declined to rule that the city ordinance conflicted with
the state statute because the Respondents failed to meet their burden to show the ordinance
to be invalid.2 R. 164. Respondents did not appeal this ruling.
Notwithstanding the failure of Respondents to notify Salt Lake City of their claim
that the Ordinance was invalid so that the City could appear and defend the Ordinance, they
totally failed to offer any evidence to the trial court to support their claim.
The validity of the Salt Lake City ordinance should not have been decided by the
Court of Appeals. If the majority felt that the issue of the validity of the ordinance was

2

While the lower court refused to rule the ordinance invalid due to the lack of
evidence to support such claim, Section 78-33-11 would preclude a ruling on the validity
of the ordinance without Salt Lake City being a party to the proceeding.
15

necessary to its decision, it should have remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing, with
directions that Salt Lake City be made a party as required by U.C.A. Section 78-33-11.
The City of Salt Lake has never been joined as a party, and it was error for the Court
of Appeals to determine the validity of its ordinance.
IX
ARGUMENT
Point I
A PERSON HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO RELY UPON THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE OF AN EXISTING CITY ORDINANCE.
Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States and Article I,
Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution guarantee a person due process of law.
One of the major protections provided by the guarantee of due process of law is the
right to receive fair warning of conduct proscribed by law. See State v. Blowers, supra;
Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, supra; People v. Frazer, supra; People v.
Escobar, supra; Vo v. Superior Court, 836 P.2d 408 (Ariz. App. 1992). Due process
protections exist to prevent the inherent unfairness which would result from altering the
legal consequences of events or acts after the fact. Id. See State v. Byers, supra; People v.
D.K.B., supra. Under theories of due process, a person is entitled to act in reliance on the
plain language of existing laws without fear that such conduct may later be made
punishable by a court subsequently declaring the conduct to be illegal. See, Bouie v City of
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Columbus, supra\ Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,28-29 (1981); State v. Byers, supra;
Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, supra; Vo v. Superior Court, supra. Arizona
Dept. of Public Safety v. Superior Court of Maricopa Co., 190 Ariz. 490, 949 P.2d 983,
987, f.n.4 (Ariz. App. 1997) rev. den. 192 Ariz 276, 964 P.2d 447 (1997); People v. Benney
757 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Colo. 1987); Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1986); State v
Hull, 86 Wash.2d 527, 546 P.2d 912 (1976).
Due process of law allows a person to rely on the plain language of an existing city
ordinance in determining what constitutes legal and proper behavior under the law. A
person must be allowed to act in his daily activities without fear of legal consequences
based upon a subsequent change in the law. To hold otherwise violates constitutional
principles of due process. Id.
Respondents claim that Hansen could not legally ride in the left bicycle lane because
the city ordinance conflicted with state statutes that required bicycle riders to ride only on
the right hand side of a roadway. Petitioners argued there was no conflict, but even if a
conflict existed, a subsequent invalidation of the ordinance by ruling of the Appellate Court
cannot be applied retroactively to affect Hansen's conduct without violating principals of
due process.
The Trial Court refused to invalidate the ordinance, but then said Hansen was not
entitled to rely on the ordinance. The trial court said:
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that
Plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor state law in
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traveling in the direction he was against traffic (emphasis
added). R. 164.
The trial court did not discuss how it reached this conclusion, and it completely failed to
consider the constitutional implications of its decision.
As a general rule, if a municipality has the power to pass an ordinance, but exercises
the power in an unauthorized manner, the ordinance is still valid and binding until set aside
in legal proceedings instituted for that purpose. Regency Park L.P. v. City ofTopeka, 267
Kan. 465, 981 P.2d 256 (1999); 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 20.14 (3d ed. Rev.
1998); 56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporation § 315 at p. 353. This Court has held that an
ordinance is presumptively valid and remains valid until overturned. Redwood Gym v. Salt
Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981); Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314
(Utah 1983).
Due process prohibits the retroactive application of a judicial decision to punish an
act that was not criminal when it was performed. Bouie v City of Columbus, supra at 35354; Vo v. Superior Court, supra. Thus in the present case, the Salt Lake City Ordinance
was valid and binding until the ruling by the Court of Appeals in this case. Thus, unless the
ruling of the Court of Appeals is retroactively applied, Hansen had a legal right to ride in
the left-hand bicycle lane on February 17, 2000.
Neither the Trial Court nor the Appellate Court discussed or considered the effect
that retroactive application of a ruling invalidating the ordinance would have on Hansen's
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constitutional right to due process of law.3 The appellate court simply said the ordinance
was invalid, and affirmed the judgment that Hansen had no legal right to rely upon an
existing city ordinance.4 They were silent on whether they intended the ruling to be applied
retroactively. They simply invalidated the ordinance, even though the trial court said it had
been given no evidence on that issue.
The effect of the appellate court's decision affirming the ruling of the trial court is to
retroactively invalidate the ordinance and thereby criminalize Hansen's prior conduct5. That
denies him due process of law. Bouie v City of Columbus, supra; Weaver v. Graham, supra
at 28-29; State v. Byers, supra; Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, supra; Vo v.
Superior Court, supra.

3

The usual effect of such a ruling would be for it to have only prospective
application. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-5; Regency Park, LP v City ofTopeka, 267 Kan.
465,981 P.2d 256; 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 20.14 (3d ed. Rev. 1998); 56
Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations § 315 at p. 353. Retroactive application of this
Court's decision would deny Hansen due process of law. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 387
U.S. 347,353-55(1964).
4

Because the trial court ruled that the jury would need to be instructed that Hansen
had no legal right to ride in the left hand bicycle lane, the only way such an instruction
could be legally justified would be to retroactively invalidate the ordinance which
allowed such travel and thereby remove the legal justification for Hansen's behavior on
February 17,2000.
5

Violation of the motor vehicle statutes is a misdemeanor. Removal of the
protection provided by reliance on the city ordinance to justify his behavior, Hansen
would be subject to a criminal charge for violation of the requirement to ride on the right
hand side of the roadway.
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The majority opinion conflicts with the mandate of Bouie, supra, which prohibits
retroactive application of a ruling on the validity of a statute or ordinance where retroactive
application would criminalize actions previously taken in reliance on the language of the
ordinance.
Tyler Hansen rode in the left hand bicycle lane in reliance on the plain language of
the ordinance. He was innocent of any intent to break the law. The law certainly cannot
expect a lay person to realize that there might be a conflict between a city ordinance that
expressly allows bicycles in the left bicycle lane and a state law. Not even the Court of
Appeals could agree on a finding that such a conflict existed.
Retroactive application of the Court's ruling would subject Hansen to the claim he
acted negligently when he in fact was following the requirements of an extant city
ordinance. Such a result would clearly violate Hansen's due process rights. Id. It is well
settled law that:
A State Supreme Court, no less than a state legislature, is barred
from making conduct criminal which was innocent when it
occurred through the process of judicial interpretation.
People v. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th 740, 752, 837 P.2d 1100, 1107 (1992); See Bouie,
Supra. Due process protections ensure the citizenry fair warning of conduct that is
proscribed by law. Since Hansen's conduct conformed to the express language of the
Ordinance on February 17, 2000, the Trial Court erred in its ruling. Plaintiffs' Partial
Summary Judgment Motion should have been granted.
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Point II
CONDUCT WHICH COMPLIES WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF AN
EXISTING ORDINANCE IS NOT NEGLIGENT.
To be found negligent, a person must have a legal duty to act in a defined manner,
breach that duty, and thereby cause injury to another.
In the present case, Respondents claim Hansen had a legal duty to ride his bicycle
only on the right-hand side of the roadway. Respondents claim that Hansen breached this
duty by riding in the left-hand bicycle lane and that such breach was a contributing cause of
the collision between Hansen and Eyre. Respondents seek to use Model Utah Jury
Instruction ("MUJI") 3.11 in conjunction with state statutes which generally require a
vehicle to be driven on the right side of a roadway to argue that Hansen was negligent in
riding in the left-hand bicycle lane. To support this claim, Respondents asked the trial court
to rule, as a matter of law, that Hanson had no legal right to ride in the left-hand bicycle
lane. In response to the Respondents' arguments, the trial court ruled:
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that
Plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor state law in
traveling in the direction he was against traffic (emphasis
added). R. 164.
Petitioners claim that the plain language of Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070
allows a bicycle rider to use the left-hand bicycle lane, and, therefore, such conduct cannot
of itself constitute negligence. Petitioners responded to Respondents' arguments by stating
that even if the Trial Court should strike down the city ordinance, Hansen's conduct on the
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date of the collision would not be unlawful or negligent because he had acted pursuant to
an extant city ordinance that allowed him to travel in the left-hand bicycle lane. Tr.6.
Respondents' attempts, throughout these proceedings, to have the Court declare the
city ordinance invalid ignore the issue of Hansen's right to rely on existing law. Due
process considerations forbid use of a post-collision ruling on the validity of the city
ordinance as a basis for determining whether or not Hansen's conduct on February 17, 2000
was negligent. See Point I, supra.
Utah law allows a jury to find a person negligent for violating a law intended to
promote safety. E.g. Gaxv v. State ex rel. Dep V of Transportation, supra; Hall v Warren,
supra. See MUJI 3.11. However, where a city ordinance by its plain language allows
certain conduct, due process considerations would preclude a finding that such conduct is
negligent based upon a later finding by a Court that there is a conflict between the city
ordinance and a state law. Bouie v. City of Columbus, 387 U.S.347 (1964); State v. Byers,
supra; Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, supra. People v. Frazer, supra; People
v. Escobar, supra.
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) clearly allows a bicycle rider to ride in the
left-hand bicycle lane. The Trial Court refused to invalidate the Ordinance. The Court of
Appeals, in a split decision, ruled the Ordinance to be invalid, but refused to discuss or rule
upon the due process implications of the ruling.
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Hansen was acting lawfully when he rode in accordance with the express language
of the City Ordinance. Any other conclusion is a violation his due process rights which
allow him to rely in his conduct upon the plain wording of the Ordinance. Hansen is
entitled to rely upon the language of the Ordinance as defining lawful conduct. A person
who acts in accordance with the express language of an existing law may not be found
negligent where he acted in conformance with an existing ordinance. Thus it was error for
the Trial Court to rule that Hansen had no right to rely on the language of the Ordinance
and to refuse to grant plaintiffs' Partial Summary Judgment Motion.
Point HI
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 41-6-17(n(h) ALLOWS LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO
REGULATE THE OPERATION OF BICYCLES WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTION.
SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 12.80.070(1) IS A REASONABLE AND VALID
EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO REGULATE BICYCLES.
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-17(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local authorities,
with respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the
reasonable exercise of police power, from:
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles . . . .
Salt Lake City, pursuant to the power granted by Section 41-6-17(l)(h), adopted
Chapter 12.80 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances. Ordinance 12.80.070 provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
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It is unlawful for operators of bicycles:
(H) when riding upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to
ride upon the sidewalk or any portion of the roadway outside
the marked bicycle lane except when making a left turn;
(I) to ride upon the left hand side of any street, except when
they are within a marked bicycle lane or when riding upon a
one-way street (emphasis added).
Petitioners asked the District Court to rule, as a matter of law, that Ordinance
12.80.070(1) allowed Hansen to lawfully operate his bicycle in the left-hand bicycle lane on
200 South in Salt Lake City on February 17, 2000. See Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. R.45.
Respondents asked the Trial Court to rule that Ordinance 12.80.070(1) was invalid,
and that Hansen violated Utah Code Ann. Sections 41-6-87 and 41-6-87.5 by riding
eastbound in the left-hand bicycle lane on 200 South. R.l 15.
Petitioner argued Ordinance 12.80.070(1) allowed Hansen to travel in the left-hand
bicycle lane at the time of the collision. R.45-50;133.138;1551-154. Respondents argued
Utah Code Ann. Sections 41-6-87 and 41-6-87.5 are controlling and the City Ordinance is
invalid because it conflicts with these Statutes. R.l 11-115;145-147.
Petitioners then argued that even if the Court were to declare Ordinance 12.80.070(1)
invalid, Hansen's actions on the date of the collision were lawful because he acted in
reliance on the extant Ordinance. Tr. 7.
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The Trial Court determined the Respondents had failed to present any evidence
which could serve as a basis to invalidate Ordinance 12.80.070, and failed to show that the
Ordinance was not a proper exercise of the police power granted under Utah Code Ann.
Section 41-6-17(l)(h). See R.164. However, the effect of the Trial Court's ruling was to
hold Hansen in violation of Sections 41-6-87(1) while riding in compliance with the Salt
Lake City Ordinance. The Court further ruled that the jury was to be instructed that Hansen
had no legal right to ride in compliance with the city ordinance. R. 164.
That ruling violated Hansen's right to due process of law. Point I, supra.
The Court of Appeals ruled the city ordinance invalid and affirmed the ruling of the
trial court.
The only limitation our Legislature has placed on the right of cities to regulate the
operation of bicycles on city streets is that a city reasonably exercise the police power. Utah
Code Ann. Section 41-6-17 (1953 as amended). The Salt Lake City Ordinance at issue (128-070) provides, inter alia, that on streets where there are bicycle lanes, bicycles are to
travel in such bicycle lanes. Ordinance 12.80.070(H). The language of the Ordinance
specifically provides that a bicycle may travel in the left-hand bicycle lane. Ordinance
12.80.070(1).
An analysis of the applicable statutes clearly mandates the conclusion that the City
has not exceeded its authority in adopting Ordinance 12.80.070(H) and (I) and that the
Ordinance does not conflict with state statutes.
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Section 41-6-87(1) clearly provides that a bicycle operator riding at less than normal
traffic speed6 must ride "as near as practicable to the right hand edge of the roadway . . ."
Section 41-6-87(1) allows three specific exceptions to the right-hand operation
requirement. One of these is when "preparing to make a left-hand turn at an intersection/'
See Section 41-6-87(l)(b). It is undisputed that Hansen intended to turn left at the 500 East
intersection. Therefore, his riding in the left-hand bicycle lane with the intention of making
a left hand turn fits within the express exception contained in subsection (1).
Even if the facts were otherwise, the requirement of Section 41-6-87(1) that a
bicycle travel on the right edge of the roadway is subject to other exceptions contained in
Section 41-6-87. Nothing in Section 41-6-87 would indicate an intent to prevent a city from
adopting additional exceptions, pursuant to the power granted by Section 41-6-17(l)(h) to
regulate bicycles and the provisions of Section 41-6-87(3) to require travel in a bicycle lane
where provided.
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87(3) specifically provides:
If a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a
roadway, bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway.7
6

The constraint imposed by section 41-6-87 applies when the bicycle is operated
at "less than normal speed of traffic." The undisputed testimony is that Mr. Hansen was
riding at approximately 20 M.P.H. at the time of the collision. Since this is, arguably,
"operation at the normal speed of traffic," it could be argued that section 41-6-87 does not
even apply and is not in conflict with the Ordinance.
7

This is the identical requirement imposed by Ordinance 12.80.070(H) that where
there is a marked bicycle lane (path) bicycles must travel in the bicycle lane and not in the
roadway. Clearly, the legislature intended bicycles to use bicycle lanes where provided.
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The bicycle lanes at issue are adjacent to the traveled portion of 200 South. Bike
riders are required to use designated lanes when provided. The lanes border the traveled
portions of the roadway. The bicycle lanes are clearly "a path adjacent to a roadway" and
bicycle riders are required to use them for travel. A bicycle rider using such lane is
exempted from the right hand travel requirement. Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87.
Having provided the exceptions set out in Section 41-6-87(1), it cannot logically be
concluded that the power granted to cities by Section 41-6-17(l)(h) precludes adopting
additional exceptions, particularly respecting the use of designated bicycle lanes which
exist solely for the use of bicycle traffic.
There is simply no justifiable basis for arguing that Salt Lake City has exceeded the
authority to regulate the operation of bicycles in the City granted by Section 41-6-17(l)(h).
The Ordinance is presumptively valid. Murray City v Hall, supra. This Court should rule
that Ordinance 12.80.070(1) is valid and that Hansen was acting lawfully while riding
eastbound in a bicycle lane on the north side of 200 South.
When construing a statute, the plain language rule of statutory construction requires
a Court to look first to the plain meaning of the words used and their statutory context. The
plain language rule also requires that the Court give effect to all the terms of a statute so
that no one provision is construed in isolation. Furthermore, ,,fif doubt or uncertainty exists
as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions, the Court should analyze the act in
its entirety and harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and
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purpose.'" Kimball Condos. Owners Ass'n v. County Bd. of Equalization, 943 P.2d 642, 648
(Utah 1997). Further, when two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the
provision more specific in application governs over the more general provision. Hall v.
Department of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001); Taghipour v Jerez, 52 P.3d 1252
(Utah 2002) JJ.W.v State, 33 P.3d 59 (Utah 2001).
Taking the statute as a whole, it is clear that Section 41-6-87 does not prohibit the
use of a left-hand bicycle path. While it is true that Section 41-6-87 in Subsection (1) sets
forth a general rule, with some stated exceptions, requiring bicyclists to "ride as near as
practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway," it is also clear that subsection (1) was
not intended to apply in cases where a roadway has an adjacent bicycle path. This is the
logical conclusion given the fact that Subsection (1) never mentions bicycle paths and
Subsection (3) specifically deals with bicycle path use.
Subsection (3) requires the use of a bicycle path when one exists. Thus, while
Subsection (1) sets forth a rule of general application, it does not govern the specific
situation where a bicycle path exists. Thus, the provision more specific in application
[Subsection (3)] should govern over the more general provision [Subsection (1)]. Hall v.
Department of Corrections, supra. To conclude otherwise, as the Court of Appeals has
done in this case, poses at least three serious problems that prevent the required
harmonizing all portions of the statute. See Hansen v. Eyret 74 P. 3d 1182 (Utah App.
2003). (Dissent of Justice Jackson).
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First, if Subsection (1) absolutely requires bicyclists to ride on the right side of the
roadway even when a left-hand bicycle path exists, then an exception to Subsection (3) is
necessarily created which the legislature did not include when it drafted the statute.
Specifically, Subsection (3) provides that M[i]f a usable path for bicycles has been provided
adjacent to a roadway, bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway." Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-87(3). It does not say "bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway,
unless the path is on the left-hand side of the roadway." Subsection (3) requires the use of
an existing bicycle path without limitation as to which direction the bicyclist must ride, and
does not limit bicyclists to one side of the road.
Second, to construe Section 41-6-87 as was done by the Court of Appeals renders
Subsection (3) inoperable. If Subsection (1) requires bicyclists to ride on the right side of
the road and precludes them from riding in a left-hand bicycle path, then Subsection (3)
would be inoperable whether there is a bicycle path on either side or both sides.
Third, such a construction renders Subsections (1) and (3) contradictory, thus
subverting the rule that a court must harmonize a statute's provisions. Id.
The only logical way to harmonize the three subsections of Section 41-6-87 and give
meaning to the discretion to regulate bicycle traffic given to cities by Section 41-6-17(l)(h),
is to rule that the city ordinance is valid. Otherwise, if a bicyclist were to stay to the far
right of the roadway where a left-hand, but no right-hand bicycle path exists, he would
violate the mandate of Subsection (3) to ride in the designated bicycle path. On the other
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hand, if he followed the mandate of Subsection (3) by riding in the designated bicycle path,
he would violate the general provisions of Subsection (1) that require him to stay to the far
right of the roadway unless the bicycle lane was in fact placed to the far right of the
roadway.
Clearly, in order to harmonize and give effect to all portions of Section 41-6-87, as
adopted by the Utah Legislature, the Court must hold that Subsection (1) sets forth a
general rule that does not contemplate a roadway with designated bicycle paths. Instead,
Subsection (3) applies and requires the use of a bicycle path where one exists. Further,
Section 41-6-87 does not prohibit the use of a left-hand bicycle path and a rider has the
right under the Salt Lake City Ordinance to use either the right-hand or left-hand bicycle
path at his discretion.
Point IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION FOR HANSEN RIDING HIS BICYCLE EASTBOUND IN THE
NORTH BICYCLE LANE ON 200 SOUTH.
A.

Introduction

The Trial Court declined to rule that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) was
invalid. R. 164. The Court said:
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that
Plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor State law in
traveling in the direction he was against traffic. Id.
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In reaching the conclusion that Hansen was not justified in traveling in the left-hand
bicycle lane at the time of the collision, the Court found:
State law was and is (and probably always has been) clear that
bicycles are to ride in the direction of motor vehicle traffic.
R. 164
However, having made this finding, the Trial Court expressly pointed out that the
Respondents failed to present any facts to support their claim that the Ordinance was not a
reasonable exercise of the City's police power granted under Utah Code Ann. section 41-617(l)(h). Id. The Trial Court discussed the matter as follows:
An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with
such state law. Further, any ordinance which is to regulate
bicycle traffic is to be within reasonable police powers under
41-6-17. To allow bicycle riders to ride against traffic, even in a
marked bicycle lane, appears to invite the very sort of incident
that is the subject of this lawsuit. However, the Court is without
any facts (as pointed out by Plaintiff) to find that such an
ordinance is not within the reasonable police powers. However,
from a common sense standpoint it is well known that the
tendency of most motorists, any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, when they are turning right onto a
perpendicular street, is to look to their left for oncoming traffic,
but not to look to their right. Thus, an ordinance that allows
such bicycle traffic as Plaintiff argues may or may not be within
the police powers of the City. The Court is not ruling on that
aspect as it is without sufficient facts. Again, however, the
ordinance appears to create problems with bicyclists in the
same narrow lane going in two different directions. It invites
dangers to motorists turning into oncoming bicycle traffic. The
SLC ordinance thus appears to not be within reasonable police
powers to attempt to allow such dangerous conduct. Those
comments, however, are not governing this case. R. 164.
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Based upon this reasoning, the Trial Court denied Petitioners' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment that asked the Court to rule that the City Ordinance allowed Hansen to
travel in the left-hand bicycle lane. At the same time, the Court ruled that the Ordinance did
not justify his actions. Id. This ruling is legally inconsistent and in error.
B.

The Statutes and Ordinance, when read together, allow travel in a left-hand
bicycle lane.

Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87 is a general Statute which provides that bicycle
riders traveling at less than normal speed must ride on the right side of the road. The Salt
Lake City Ordinances are specific. Bicycles must travel in bicycle lanes if provided.8 [See
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(H)] and may travel on the left hand side of the
roadway if in a designated bicycle lane. [See Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1)].
There is nothing in the State Statute (41-6-87) that indicates that exceptions cannot be
created to the general duty to ride on the right side of the roadway. In fact, Section 41-687.5 provides just such an exception for left turns. The City Ordinance [12.80.070(1)] also
provides an exception. Since the City Ordinance is specific and the State Statute general,
the specific (Ordinance) controls. J J. W. v State, supra; See Taghipour v Jerez, supra.

8

Section 41-6-87(3) would appear to support the requirements of the Salt Lake
City Bicycle Lane Ordinance that bicycles travel in a designated bike lane if one is
available.
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The Court also has a duty to construe the Ordinance so as to give it full force and
effect. Jerz v Salt Lake County, supra. The court also construes acts to be in harmony so as
to avoid conflicts. Id; Murray City v Hall, supra.
Respondents argue that the State Statute (41-6-87) pre-empts or trumps the Salt
Lake City Ordinance. However, for that to be so, Respondent would have to show a
specific intent of the State Legislature (when enacting section 41-6-87) to exclude a
coterminous exercise of law making power on the subject, because they granted local
authorities the power to regulate bicycle traffic U.C.A. Section 41-6-17(l)(h). See Gilger v.
Hernandez, 997 P.2d 305 (Utah 2000). No such showing was made by Respondents. In
fact, the specific grant of power to cities to regulate bicycle traffic set forth in Utah Code
Ann. Section 41-6-17(l)(h) indicates the Legislature's intention to allow the cities to
regulate bicycle traffic as they see fit.
The Court should construe each Statute so as to give it full force and effect.
Moreover, they should be construed to find harmony and to avoid conflicts. This is
especially so because the duty set forth in U.C.A. Section 41-6-87 is not absolute. The
legislature itself has provided exceptions to the general rule. The Court should hold that the
Ordinance allowing travel in a left-hand bicycle lane is a valid exercise of the City's police
power and that Hansen was justified in riding in conformity therewith.
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Point V
THE VALIDITY OF SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 12.80.070(1) WAS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DECISION.
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1), as it existed on February 17, 2000, allowed a
bicycle rider to ride in the left-hand bicycle lane in Salt Lake City. Petitioners asked the
trial court to rule on a single issue, "does the ordinance give a rider the legal right so to
ride?"
Respondents opposed the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. They claimed the
ordinance was in conflict with state law. In response, Petitioners argued that the
Respondents had failed to produce any evidence or other factual basis that would allow the
court to declare the ordinance to be invalid. In addition, Petitioners argued that even if the
court declared the ordinance invalid, such a ruling could not be applied retroactively to
criminalize behavior that conformed to an extant city ordinance.
U.C.A. § 78-33-11 states:
... In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal
... ordinance ... such municipality ... shall be made a party ...
The Respondents did not notify Salt Lake City Corporation of their claim that Ordinance
12.80.070(1) was invalid. They made no attempt to join Salt Lake City as a party to the
underlying action for the purpose of allowing the city the opportunity to defend the validity
of their ordinance.
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The lower court specifically declined to rule that the city ordinance conflicted with
the state statute because the Respondents failed to meet their burden to show the ordinance
to be invalid.9 R. 164. Respondents did not appeal this ruling.
However, without either party requesting such a ruling in their memoranda or
argument, the Trial Court ordered:
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that
Plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor state law in
traveling in the direction he was against traffic (emphasis
added). R. 164.
Petitioners then sought an interlocutory appeal of the Trial Court's order. Petitioners
reasoned that the validity of the ordinance was not really the controlling issue because
unless the ordinance was determined to be invalid, and such ruling was given retroactive
effect, Petitioners' Partial Summary Judgment Motion was well taken. This was the theory
behind Petitioner's appeal.
Because the Lower Court had declined to rule the ordinance invalid, it did not rule
on the issue of whether or not invalidation of the ordinance should be applied retroactively.
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals discussed only one issue, "is the city ordinance
valid." The majority said the ordinance is invalid, and then affirmed the Trial Court's
initial ruling. The majority never discussed the issue of retroactive application of the ruling,

9

While the lower court refused to rule the ordinance invalid due to the lack of
evidence to support such claim, Section 78-33-11 would preclude a ruling on the validity
of the ordinance without Salt Lake City being a party to the proceeding.
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and its effect on the Trial Court's order quoted above. The Court of Appeals refused to deal
with the due process implications of their order.
The validity of the Salt Lake City ordinance should not have been decided by the
Court of Appeals. If the majority felt that the issue of the validity of the ordinance was
necessary to its decision, it should have remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing, with
directions that Salt Lake City be made a party as required by U.C.A. Section 78-33-11.
The constitutionality of a retroactive application of any ruling on the validity of the
ordinance should have first been decided prior to getting to the issue of the validity of the
ordinance because unless the ruling on the validity of the ordinance is to be retroactively
applied, it is immaterial to the issue of whether or not Hansen was justified by the city
ordinance in riding in the left-hand bicycle lane. The Court of Appeals ignored this issue.
As set forth in Point I above, due process of law precludes retroactive application of
a ruling that criminalizes conduct after the fact.10 If Hansen is correct that retroactive
application is constitutionally impermissible, then it is immaterial whether or not the
ordinance was invalid. He had a legal right to act in conformance with the ordinance as a
matter of law and his summary judgment motion should have been granted.

10

Unless a ailing that the ordinance is invalid is applied retroactively to
criminalize behavior in conformity with the extant ordinance, Hansen had the legal right
to ride in conformance with the language of the ordinance and, as a matter of law, his
motion for partial summary judgment should have been granted.
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In conclusion, the City of Salt Lake has never been joined as a party, and it was error
for the Court of Appeals to ignore the mandate of Section 78-33-11 and rule on the issue of
the validity of the ordinance without Salt Lake City having been made a party to the
proceeding.
X
CONCLUSION
Premises considered, this Court should reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals
and remand this matter back to the Trial Court with instructions to grant Petitioner's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of Hansen's legal right to operate his
bicycle in the left-hand bicycle lane on 200 South pursuant to Salt Lake City Ordinance
12.80.070(1).

/ 7 day
^ of March, 2004.
Respectfully submitted this !(/.

Mel. S. Martin, P.C.

Attorney for Plaintiffs/Petitioners
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATUTES
ORDINANCES
RULES

o-x 4. jxegmaiory powers ox local a u m o r m e s — 'iramccontrol device affecting state highway — Necessity of erecting traffic-control devices.
) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local authorities, with
>ect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable
•cise of police power, from:
(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking;
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace officers or official traffic-control
devices;
(c) regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the highways;
(d) designating particular highways or roadways for use by traffic
moving in one direction under Section 41-6-60;
(e) estabKshing speed limits for vehicles in public parks, which supersede Section 41-6-48 regarding speed limits;
(f) designating any highway as a through highway or designating any
intersection or junction of roadways as a stop or yield intersection or
junction;
(g) restricting the use of highways under Section 72-7-408;
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring the registration
and inspection of them, including requiring a registration fee;
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or specified types of
vehicles;
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under Section 41-6-48;
(k) requiring written accident reports under Section 41-6-42;
(1) designating no-passing zones under Section 41-6-59;
(m) prohibiting or regulating the use of controlled-access roadways by
any class or kind of traffic under Section 41-6-65;
(n) prohibiting or regulating the use of heavily traveled streets by any
class or kind of traffic found to be incompatible with the normal and safe
movement of traffic;
(o) estabKshing minimum speed limits under Subsection 41-6-49(3);
(p) designating and regulating traffic on play streets;
(q) prohibiting pedestrians from crossing a highway in a business
district or any designated highway except in a crosswalk under Section
41-6-77;
(r) restricting pedestrian crossings at unmarked crosswalks under
Section 41-6-82.10;
(s) regulating persons propelling push carts;
(t) regulating persons upon skates, coasters, sleds, skateboards, and
other toy vehicles;
(u) adopting and enforcing temporary or experimental ordinances as
necessary to cover emergencies or special conditions;
(v) prohibiting drivers of ambulances from exceeding maximum speed
limits;
(w) adopting other traffic ordinances as specifically authorized by this
chapter.

(2) A local authority may not erect or maintain any official traffic-control
device at any location which requires the traffic on any state highway to stop
before entering or crossing any intersecting highway unless approval in
writing has first been obtained from the Department of Transportation,
(3) An ordinance enacted under Subsection (l)(d), (e), (f), (g), (i), (j), (1), (m),
(n), (p), or (r) is not effective until official traffic-control devices giving notice of
the local traffic ordinances are erected upon or at the entrances to the highway
or part of it affected as is appropriate.

41-6-87. Operation of bicycle or moped on and use of
roadway — Duties, prohibitions*
(1) A person operating a bicycle or a moped upon a roadway at less than the
normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then
existing shall ride as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway
except when:
(a) overtaking and passing another bicycle or vehicle proceeding in the
same direction;
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an intersection or into a private
road or driveway; or
(c) reasonably necessary to avoid conditions including, but not limited
to, fixed or moving objects, parked or moving vehicles, bicycles, pedestrians, animals, surface hazards, or substandard width lanes that make it
unsafe to continue along the right-hand edge. In this subsection, "substandard width lane* means a lane that is too narrow for a bicycle and a vehicle
to travel safely side by side within the lane.
(2) Persons riding bicycles or mopeds upon a roadway may not ride more
than two abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the
exclusive use of bicycles. Persons riding two abreast may not impede the
normal and reasonable movement of traffic and on a laned roadway shall ride
within a single lane.
(3) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway,
bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway.

41=@-87o5e Bicycles a n d mopeds — Turns — Designated
lanes*
(1) A person riding a bicycle or moped and intending to turn left shall
comply with Section 41-6-66 or Subsection (2).
(2) A person riding a bicycle or moped intending to turn left shall approach
the turn as close as practicable to the right curb or edge of the roadway. After
proceeding, across the intersecting roadway, to the far corner of the curb or
intersection of the roadway edges, the bicyclist or moped operator shall stop, as
far out of the way of traffic as practical. After stopping he shall yield to any
traffic proceeding in either direction along the roadway he had been using.
After yielding and complying with any official traffic-control device or peace
officer regulating traffic, he may proceed in the new direction.

ition and local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause official
affic-control devices to be placed and require and direct that a specific course
5 traveled by turning bicycles and mopeds. When the devices are placed, a
>rson may not turn a bicycle other than as directed by the devices.

8-3-5, Effect of repeal.
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, or affect
ay right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any
:tion or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed.

U2-2, Supreme Court jurisdiction.
[I) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state
v certified by a court of the United States.
2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
its and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
erlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court ofAppeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(hi) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department 'of Natural Resources
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under'Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a
first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees
ruling on legislative subpoenas.
-) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
ters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,

(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections^(3)Ta) through-(d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudicition,, but:$lie
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the^ourt^of Appeals.
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica^
tive proceedings.

78-33-11.

Parties.

When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made parties who have
or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.
In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal or county
ordinance or franchise such municipality or county shall be made a party, and
shall be entitled to be heard, and if a statute or state franchise or permit is
alleged to be invalid the attorney general shall be served witlf a copy of the
proceeding and be entitled to be heard.

12.30.070 Riding rules and regulations-Unlawful acts.
It is unlawful for operators of bicycles:
A. When riding upon a sidewalk to fail to yield the right-of-way to pedestrians and sound a
warning device before overtaking or passing any pedestrian;
B. To ride more than two abreast upon any street;
C. To proceed other than single file upon any sidewalk;
D. To carry extra passengers or carry any packages, bundles or articles which would require
the removal of the hand or hands from the handlebars of the bicycle;
E. To permit the bicycle such operator is riding to be towed by another vehicle or bicycle;
F. To ride any bicycle upon any sidewalk within the central traffic district, as defined in Section
12.04.090 of this title, or its successor, and as described in Schedule 1 of this title, set out
in Chapter 12.104, or its successor, and made a part hereof by reference, or on any other
area where prohibited by signs, provided, however, the foregoing shall not apply to police
officers in the scope and course of their employment;
G. To carry more persons at a time than the number for which the bicycle is designed to carry
on seats firmly attached thereto;
H. When riding upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to ride upon the sidewalk or any
portion of the roadway outside the marked bicycle lane except when making a left turn;
I. To ride upon the left-hand side of any street, except when they are within a marked bicycle
lane or when riding upon a one-way street. (Ord. 16-89 § 1, 1989; prior code Title 46, Art.
18 §278)
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UTAH
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
MUJI 3.11
VIOLATION OF STATUTE, ORDINANCE,
OR SAFETY ORDER
A violation of a safety law is evidence of negligence if it is
shown that:
1. The person injured belonged to a class of people t h e law
intended to protect; and
2. The law intended to protect against the type of harm which
in fact occurred as a result of the violation. However, there are five
exceptions to this rule:
(1) When obeying the law would have created an even
greater risk of harm.
(2) When t h e person who violated the law was faced with
an emergency that person did not create, and, by reason of the
emergency, that person could not obey t h e law.
(3) When t h e person who violated the law made a
reasonable effort to obey the law, but was unable to do so.
(4) When t h e person who violated the law could not obey
the law because the person was incapable of doing so.
(5) When t h e person violating the law was incapable of
understanding t h e requirements of the law.
The person violating the law has the burden of proving one of
the exceptions. If a n exception is proven by a preponderance of t h e
evidence, you must disregard the violation of the safety law^and
simply decide whether the person acted with reasonable care under
the circumstances*
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THORNE, Judge:
Hi
Appellants Tyler Hansen and the Workers' Compensation Fund
appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for partial
summary judgment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
f2
On February 17, 2 000, Hansen was r.iding his bicycle
eastbound, an the left ,hand side of the street and against the
flow of traffic, but within the confines of a marked bicycle
path. As he approached the intersection of 200 South and 50 0
East, Amarida Eyre was waiting in her car for the flow of
westbound traffic to subside so that she could turn right into
the westbound lane of 2 00 South. When Eyre was satisfied that
the flow of traffic was sufficiently light to allow her to
successfully make her right turn, she accelerated around the
corner. However, before Eyre could complete her turn, she and
Hansen collided, injuring Hansen. When the accident occurred,

both Hansen and Eyre were operating within the scope of their
employment.
^3
Following the accident, Hansen, along with the Workers'
Compensation Fund, filed suit. In essence, Hansen claimed that
Eyre had violated various sections of the Utah Code, and at least
one provision of the Salt Lake City ordinances, thereby causing
the accident. Hansen filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, asking the trial court to rule that Hansen "had a legal
right to ride a bicycle in an eastbound direction in the
designated bicycle lane on the north side of 2 00 South Street in
Salt Lake City." Hansen based his motion on Salt Lake City, Ut.,
Ordinance 12.80.070 (Supp. 1998) which reads, in relevant part:
"It is unlawful for operators of bicycles: . . . [t]o ride upon
the left-hand side of any street, except when they are within a
marked bicycle lane or when riding upon a one-way street."
^[4
Eyre opposed Hansen's motion, arguing that the Salt Lake
City Ordinance conflicted with state law and, therefore, Hansen
could not have a right to ride against the flow of traffic as a
matter of law.1 The trial court entertained oral argument and
then, in a written decision, denied Hansen's motion. In its
decision, the trial court determined that the ordinance relied
upon by Hansen operated outside Salt Lake City's reasonable
police powers2 because "state law was and is (and probably always
has been) clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction of
motor vehicle traffic. . . . An ordinance that purports to allow
otherwise is in conflict with state law." The trial court,
however, decided to leave to the trier of fact the impact of its
decision on the issue of negligence. Hansen subsequently
petitioned the supreme court for interlocutory review. The court
granted Hansenfs petition and transferred the case to this court,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78-2-2(4). See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2002). We affirm.

1. Eyre also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the
same subject, which the trial court later denied. However, the
disposition of Eyre's motion is not at issue in this appeal.
2. Utah's Traffic Code expressly denies to local authorities the
power to create rules or ordinances that conflict with existing
state law. See Utah Code Ann. § 46-6-16 (1998) ("A local
authority may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in
conflict with the provisions of this chapter.").
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
^5
Hansen argues that the trial court erred in its statutory
interpretation and, as a result, erred in denying his motion for
summary judgment. Issues of statutory interpretation present
questions of law that we review for correctness. See Toone v.
Weber County, 2002 UT 103,1(4, 57 P. 3d 1079. We review the
granting or denial of a summary judgment motion for correctness,
with no deference given to the trial court's decision.3 See id.
ANALYSIS
%6 Hansen asserts that pursuant to Salt Lake City, Ut.,
Ordinance 12.80.070(1) (Supp. 1998) he had an absolute right to
travel against the flow of traffic while in a designated bicycle
lane. Therefore, he argues, the trial court erred in denying his
motion for partial summary judgment. Eyre, in contrast, argues
that section 12.80.070(1) conflicts with existing state law and
is thus invalid. Because these statutory arguments are
intertwined, we address them in concert.
1[7 Well-settled rules of statutory interpretation instruct us
that
[w]hen interpreting a statute, this court
looks first to the statute's plain language
to determine the Legislature's intent and
purpose. We read the plain language of the
statute as a whole, and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other statutes in
the same chapter and related chapters. We
follow the "cardinal rule that the general
purpose, intent and purport of the whole act
shall control, and that all the parts be
interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to
its manifest object."
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12,1(17, 66 P.3d 592 (citations
omitted). Moreover,
[s]tatutes are considered to be in pari
materia and thus must be construed together
when they relate to the same person or thing,
to the same class of persons or things, or
3. The parties agree that there is no dispute as to the material
facts of this case. Thus, we focus our examination on the
correctness of the trial court's legal conclusions.

have the same purpose or object. If it is
natural or reasonable to think that the
understanding of the legislature or of
persons affected by the statute would be
influenced by another statute, then those
statutes should be construed to be in pari
materia, construed with reference to one
another and harmonized if possible.
Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985)
(footnotes omitted) .
%B
In this case, the statutory act in question is Utah's
Traffic Rules and Regulations (Traffic Control Act). See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 41-6-1 to -186 (1998 & Supp. 2002). Within the
Traffic Control Act, Article 11 contains the majority of the
statutes applicable to the use and operation of bicycles. See
id. § 41-6-83 to -90.5. However, section 41-6-84 expands the
scope of applicable regulations beyond Article 11, stating:
Except as . . . specified under this article,
a person operating a bicycle or any vehicle
or device propelled by human power or a moped
has all the rights and is subject to the
provisions of this chapter applicable to the
operator of any other vehicle.
Id. (emphasis added).
f9
Thus, we must begin our analysis with an examination of
certain terms material to the instant case. First, Utah Code
Annotated section 41-6-1(55) defines "vehicle" as "every device
in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be
transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used
exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks." Id. § 41-6-1(55)
(1998) . Clearly then, for purposes of the Traffic Control Act, a
bicycle is a vehicle. Section 41-6-1 also defines the term
"roadway." See id. § 41-6-1(39). A roadway, for purposes of the
Traffic Control Act, is "that portion of highway improved,
designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of
the sidewalk, berm, or shoulder, even though any of them are used
by persons riding bicycles or other human-powered vehicles." Id.
Thus, the areas of highway not considered part of the roadway
include, exclusively, "berm[s]," "shoulder[s]," and
"sidewalk[s]." Id. Accordingly, by both implication and plain
language, bicycle paths located on "that portion of highway
improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel" are
part of the roadway and subject to the limitations of the Traffic
Control Act. Id.
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KlO The import of these terms to the instant case becomes clear
when we examine Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-53, which states
that " [o]n all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be
operated upon the right half of the roadway."4 Id. § 41-6-53
(1998) . Applying the definitions provided within the Traffic
Control Act to section 41-6-53, "[o]n all roadways of sufficient
width [whether or not traveling in a designated bicycle path], a
[bicycle] shall be operated upon the right half of the roadway."
Id. Therefore, absent a clear exception to this rule within the
Traffic Control Act, Salt Lake City may not, in the exercise of
its police power, allow bicycle riders to ride against the flow
of traffic.
1J11 Hansen argues that such an exception exists in Utah Code
Annotated section 41-6-87 (1998) . Section 41-6-87, in relevant
part, sets forth: "A person operating a bicycle or a moped upon
a roadway at less than the normal speed of traffic at the time
and place and under the conditions then existing shall ride as
near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway except
when" the rider is "overtaking and passing another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction" of travel, "preparing to make a
left turn," or as "reasonably necessary" to avoid obstacles. Id.
§ 41-6-87(1) (a)-(c) . Section 41-6-87 further states: "If a
usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway,
bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway." Id.
§ 41-6-87(3) (emphasis added). We do not interpret this language
to provide the exception urged by Hansen.
Kl2 The term "adjacent" is defined to mean "not distant,"
"nearby," or "having the vertex and one side in common." Merriam
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 14 (10th ed. 1999). In use,
adjacent "may or may not imply contact but always implies absence
of anything of the same kind in between." Id. Thus, section 416-87(3) has application only in circumstances where a bicycle
path lies not upon or within the borders of a roadway, but'
instead when the* path lies off of, and next to, the roadway.
Only when the path is adjacent to (i.e., separate from) the
roadway is a rider required to use the path instead of the right
edge of the roadway.
Hi 3 Under the circumstances presented here, section 41-6-87(3)
has no application because the path traveled by Hansen is a part
of the roadway and not adjacent to it. Moreover, even if the
facts of this case suggested that section 41-6-87(3) was
applicable, under our general rules of statutory construction
4. Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-53 articulates four
exceptions to this rule, none of which involve bicycles.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-53(1)(a)-(d) (1998).

See

"the provision more specific in application governs over the more
general provision." Hall v. Department of Corr., 2001 UT 34,^15,
24 P.3d 958. Here, the Traffic Control Act specifically directs
that "[o]n all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be
operated upon the right half of the roadway." Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-53. In contrast, section 41-6-87(3) is silent concerning
the direction of travel required or allowed. See id. § 41-687(3). Accordingly, the specific language of section 41-6-53
governs the direction of travel that vehicles, including
bicycles, must follow when on a roadway. Thus, bicycles, like
cars, must "operate [] on the right half of the roadway," and must
conform with the flow of traffic applicable to all vehicles. Id.
§ 41-6-53.
^[14 Finally, while not controlling in this case, effective April
30, 2001, the Legislature amended section 41-6-87 to include the
following language: "A person operating a bicycle or moped on a
highway shall operate in the designated direction of traffic."
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(2) (Supp. 2002). This language
reinforces the notion that the Legislature never intended to
permit bicycle traffic to flow against the direction of traffic,
regardless of the existence of bicycle paths.5
CONCLUSION
^[15 We affirm the trial court's decision denying Hansen's motion
for partial summary judgment. Moreover, we conclude that to the
extent that subsection one of Salt Lake City, Ut., Ordinance

5. Hansen presented two additional issues on appeal, both of
which essentially take the form of requesting from this court a
ruling that would foreclose the issue of comparative negligence
on remand. However, neither issue comports with the requirements
of rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Smith
v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370,f8, 995 P.2d 14 ("An issue is
inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so
lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the
reviewing court." (quotations and citation omitted)). Thus, we
do not address either point. Moreover, from our reading of the
record, the trial court has yet to issue any definitive ruling on
these issues, thus, without a final order concerning these
matters, we are without jurisdiction to address them. See State
v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305,1(7, 57 P.3d 238 ("[W]ithout a final
order on the record, [this] court has no jurisdiction to hear an
appeal.").
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12.80.070 permits the riding of a bicycle against the flow of
traffic, it is invalid.

William A. Thorne Jr.,/Judge

Hi6

I CONCUR:

JACKSON, Presiding Judge (dissenting):
fl7 I respectfully dissent from my colleagues' decision.
Although the majority opinion makes a persuasive case for
affirming the trial court's decision, I believe that to construe
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-8?(1) (1998) as the majority has done poses
several problems. These problems arise as the result of a
statutory scheme that is hardly a model of clarity and
consistency.
When construing a statute, we look first to
the plain meaning of the words used and their
statutory context. The plain language rule
also requires that we give effect 'to all the
terms of a statute so that no one provision
is construed in isolation/ Furthermore, "'if
doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning
or application of' an act's provisions, the
Court should analyze the act in its entirety
and harmonize its provisions in accordance
with the legislative intent and purpose.1"
Kimball Condos. Owners Ass'n v. County Bd: of Equalization, 943
P.2d 642, 648 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). Further, "when
two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the
provision more specific in application governs over the more
general provision." Hall v. Department of Corr., 2 001 UT 34,^10,
24 P.3d 958.
^18 When reading the statute as a whole, I would conclude the
trial court erred by ruling that section 41-6-87 prohibits the

use of a left-hand bicycle path. It is true that section 41-687(1) sets forth a general rule requiring bicyclists to "ride as
near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway." Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-87(1). However, it seems clear to me that
subsection (1) does not apply in cases where a roadway has an
adjacent bicycle path, since it never mentions bicycle paths and
since subsection (3) does.
1fl9 Subsection (3) requires the use of a bicycle path when one
exists. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(3). Thus, while subsection
(1) certainly sets forth a rule of general application, it does
not govern the specific situation where a bicycle path exists.
Thus, "the provision more specific in application [subsection
(3)] governs over the more general provision [subsection (1)]."
Hall, 2001 UT 34 at ^10.
5f20 To conclude otherwise, as the majority does, would pose at
least three serious problems that would prevent us from
harmonizing all portions of the statute. First, if we concluded
that subsection (1) requires bicyclists to stay to the right side
of the roadway even when a left-hand bicycle path exists, we
would necessarily create an exception to subsection (3) that the
legislature did not include. Specifically, subsection (3)
provides that " [i]f a usable path for bicycles has been provided
adjacent to a roadway, bicycle riders shall use the path and not
the roadway." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(3). It does not say
"bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway, unless
the path is oh the left-hand side of the roadway." Subsection
(3) requires the use of an existing bicycle path without
limitation as to which direction the bicyclist must ride, and
does not limit bicyclists to one side of the road.
1f2l Second, to construe section 41-6-87 as the majority does
renders subsection (3) inoperable. If we concluded that
subsection (1) required bicyclists to ride on the right side of
the road and precluded them from riding in a left-hand bicycle
path, then subsection (3) would be inoperable whether there is a
bicycle path on either side or both sides. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-87(1) (requiring bicyclist to stay to the far right of the
"roadway"); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(39) (defining "roadway" as
"that portion of highway . . . ordinarily used for vehicular
travel"). The bicyclist would then be required to ignore the
specific mandate to ride in the designated bicycle path, whether
adjacent to the right or the left of the roadway, and follow the
more general rule by staying as far to the right of the roadway
as possible.
1f22 Third, such a construction would render subsections (1) and
(3) contradictory, thus subverting the rule that we must
"'"harmonize its provisions. " • ,! Kimball, 943 P. 2d at 648
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IN THE DISTRICT
IN ANDcM%

RT 'OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT,
W&B§ OF UTAH

TYLER HANSEN a/Id 'WORKERS
COMPENSATION ^fUND,
Plaintiffs,

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 010203125

vs.

Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK

AMANDA EYRE and THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY,

Court Clerk: Linda Vance
June 5, 2002

Defendants.
The above matter came before the court on June 5, 2002, on
plaintiffs Motion for partial summary judgment and defendants'
cross motions for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff was present
with counsel Edward T. Wells, defendant Eyre was present through
counsel Lloyd R. Jones, and defendant Nature Conservancy was
present through counsel Robert Janicki.
In this case plaintiff s ought partial summary judgment in a
motion filed September 2 6, 2001. The court granted defendant
Eyre's Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance. Defendant Nature
Conservancy was later added a s a defendant and on March 28, 2002,
filed a cross motion for part ial summary judgment. Defendant :
Eyre joined in that motion, Plaintiff then renewed his motion
for partial summary judgment, Each party responded and the
moving parties each, replied.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The following facts do not appear to be in dispute.
This case involves an automobile-bicycle accident at
approximately 200 South and 500 East in Salt Lake 'City.
Plaintiff was traveling east-bound on 200 South, and at the time
of the accident on the north side of the street, against motor
vehicle traffic, within a marked bicycle lane.:The lane is
adjacent to vehicle travel lanes and.on^the north of the bicycle
•lane there is parking spaces for vehicles. He -was just west of
500 East, intending to turn north onto 500 East when he was hit
by the vehicle driven by defendant Eyre as she was- turning west
onto 200 South after coming from the north, thus being southbound until she began her turn and the bicycle and Eyre's vehicle
collided. Plaintiff was injured and sues Eyre and added her
employer Nature Conservancy.

ANALYSIS
The standards for granting summary judgment are well known
and will not be repeated. Plaintiff asserts that as a matter of
law the court should grant his motion and declare that under a
Salt Lake City Ordinance he had the right to be traveling in the
bicycle, lane as he was and he was thus not negligent for doing
so. Defendants assert contrariwise that the SLC Ordinance is in
conflict with Sbate law and thus plaintiff was indeed negligent
for traveling as he was in the eastbound bicycle lane against
vehicular traffic. Defendants thus claim the court should grant
their motion and find plaintiff was negligent.
Various statutes and ordinances come into play. At the time
of the incident in February, 2000, Utah Code Ann. 41-6-87
required bicycles to travel
(1) . . .as near as practicable to the right-hand edge
of the roadway except when:
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an
intersection . . .
(3) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided
adjacent to the roadway, bicycle riders shall use
the path and not the roadway.
U.C.A. 41-6-17 (1) (h) provides that local authorities, "with
respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the
reasonable exercise of police power/' may "regulate the operation
of bicycles . . ."
Plaintiff argues he was allowed to travel as he was by an
ordinance, SLC Ordinance, 12.80.070(1) which provided:
It is unlawful for operators of bicycles:
(H) When riding upon a roadway marked
with a bicycle lane to ride upon the
sidewalk or any portion of the roadway
outside the marked bicycle lane except
when making a left turn;
(I) To ride upon the left-hand side of
any street, except when they are within
a marked bicycle lane . . .
Plaintiff thus argues that the court should declare that the
ordinance allows plaintiff to ride in a marked bicycle lane, even
if it is on the left side of the road and going against vehicle
traffic.
Utah law is clear that a local ordinance may be enacted that

covers subjects already covered by state legislation but only if
state law does not foreclose local legislation and "the ordinance
in no way conflicts with existing state law."
The court finds that state law was and is (and probably
always has been) clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction
of motor vehicle traffic, U.C.A. 41-6-87(3) is not to the
contrary. The court reads that statute to mean that bicycles are
still to ride with traffic,, and if there is a bicycle lane, the
bicycles should use the lane rather than the roadway. Subsection
(3) of 41-6-87 does not give license to travel against traffic
even in a bicycle lane.
An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict
with such state law. Further, any ordinance which is to regulate
bicycle traffic is to be within reasonable police powers under
41-6-17. To allow bicycle riders to ride against traffic, even in
a marked bicycle lane, appears
to invite the very sort of
incident that is the subject of this lawsuit. However, the court
is without any facts (as pointed out by plaintiff) to find that
such an ordinance is not within the reasonable police powers.
However, from a common sense standpoint it is well known that the
tendency of most motorists, any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, when they are turning right onto a perpendicular
street, is to look to their left for oncoming traffic, but not to
look to their right. Thus, an ordinance that allows such bicycle
traffic as plaintiff argues may or may not be within the police
powers of the City. The court is not ruling on that aspect as it
is without sufficient facts. Again, however, the ordinance
appears to create problems with bicyclists in the same narrow
lane going in two different directions. It invites dangers to
motorists turning into oncoming bicycle traffic. The SLC
ordinance thus appears to not be within reasonable police powers
to attempt to allow such dangerous conduct. Those comments,
however, are not governing in this case.
However, more importantly, it is directly against the Utah
statute to travel by bicycle against the flow of vehicle traffic.
Nothing in state law gives any indication that travel by bicycles
against vehicle traffic is approved.
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is thus
denied. Defendants'' cross motions for partial summary judgment
is, however, also denied. Even if the plaintiff was not
justified by ordinance in riding in the bicycle lane against
vehicle traffic, that does not mean defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The riding conduct is certainly a
factor a trier of fact can consider in determining negligence.
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that
plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor state law in
traveling in the direction he was against traffic. That will be

one factor in their evaluation of negligence and comparative
negligence. The parties can marshal whatever evidence they have
as to the safety (or lack thereof) of such conduct.
Neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
DATED this

y

day of June, 2002,

